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Ayşegül Toptal1 · Bilgesu Çetinkaya2
Published online: 18 April 2015
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015
Abstract Environmental responsibility has become an important part of doing business.
Government regulations and customers’ increased awareness of environmental issues are
pushing supply chain entities to reduce the negative influence of their operations on the envi-
ronment. In today’s world, companies must assume joint responsibility with their suppliers
for the environmental impact of their actions. In this paper, we study coordination between
a buyer and a vendor under the existence of two emission regulation policies: cap-and-trade
and tax. We investigate the impact of decentralized and centralized replenishment decisions
on total carbon emissions. The buyer in this system faces a deterministic and constant demand
rate for a single product in the infinite horizon. The vendor produces at a finite rate andmakes
deliveries to the buyer on a lot-for-lot basis. Both the buyer and the vendor aim to minimize
their average annual costs resulting from replenishment set-ups and inventory holding. We
provide decentralized and centralized models for the buyer and the vendor to determine their
ordering/production lot sizes under each policy.We compare the solutions due to independent
and joint decision-making both analytically and numerically. Finally, we arrive at coordina-
tion mechanisms for this system to increase its profitability. However, we show that even
though such coordination mechanisms help the buyer and the vendor decrease their costs
without violating emission regulations, the cost minimizing solution may result in increased
carbon emission under certain circumstances.
Keywords Environmental regulations · Buyer–vendor coordination · Supply chains
1 Introduction and literature
Since the Industrial Revolution, the levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have
increased due to human activities. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) (2013a)
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reports that the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases exhibited an upward and
accelerating trend and reached a record high in 2012. Greenhouse gases slow or prevent the
loss of heat to space, which increases the temperature of Earth’s surface, leading to global
warming. Greenhouse gases are emitted as a result of the activities of energy industries,
transportation, residential and commercial activities, manufacturing, construction, industrial
processes, and agriculture. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the main greenhouse gas emitted as a
result of the human activities; it is responsible for 85% of the increase in global warming. The
effect of CO2 is followed by methane (CH4,) and then nitrous oxide (N2O) (WMO 2013b).
To decrease greenhouse gases (particularly CO2) emissions, policy makers and international
organizations have proposed agreements and regulations. In this paper, we study the inde-
pendent and coordinated inventory replenishment decisions of a buyer and a vendor under
two different emission regulation policies (i.e., cap-and-trade and tax), and investigate the
impact of coordinated decisions on the environment.
Under a cap-and-trade mechanism, the government sets a fixed value for the maximum
amount of carbon that can be emitted in each period (i.e., the cap) and firms are free to buy
or sell allowances in trading markets. Emission trading systems (ETSs) are currently imple-
mented in the EU (EU ETS), Australia, New Zealand (NZ ETS), Northeastern United States,
and Tokyo (Tokyo ETS), as well as in other countries (see the International Emissions Trad-
ing Association’s web site International Emissions Trading Assosication 2013). The carbon
tax mechanism puts a price on each tonne of greenhouse gas (e.g., CO2) emitted. According
to the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (2013), Finland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, the UK and Australia are among countries that have implemented a carbon tax.
Issues related to environmental policies, such as regulation design and the effect of a
domestic environmental policy on international trade or social welfare, and others, have been
widely investigated in environmental economics since the late 1960s (Cropper and Oates
1992). In contrast, the literature in operations management that considers environmental
concerns is fairly new, and focuses on tactical or operational planning decisions. Some of
these studies do not particularly assume the existence of environmental regulations; rather,
they optimize an objective function that incorporates terms dependent on environmental
performance metrics (e.g., Bonney and Jaber 2011; Bouchery et al. 2011; Chan et al. 2013;
Saadany et al. 2011), or investigate the impact of supply chain members’ greening efforts on
their profitability in different settings with environmentally conscious consumers (e.g., Liu
et al. 2012; Swami and Shah 2013). Another group of papers studies problems such as single-
item inventory replenishment, product mix, or green investment decisions, while considering
a specific environmental regulation policy (e.g., Benjaafar et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2013; Dong
et al. 2014; Du et al. 2011; Hoen et al. 2014; Hua et al. 2011; Jaber et al. 2013; Krass et al.
2013; Letmathe and Balakrishnan 2005; Song and Leng 2012; Toptal et al. 2014; Zhang and
Xu 2013). Of these papers, Benjaafar et al. (2013), Dong et al. (2014), Du et al. (2011), Krass
et al. (2013) and Jaber et al. (2013) model supply chain problems in multi-echelon settings,
as our study does.
Benjaafar et al. (2013) propose an integrated model to solve the joint lot-sizing decisions
of multiple firms subject to emission caps. Krass et al. (2013) consider a two-echelon system
in which the upper echelon is the policy maker who maximizes social welfare and the lower
echelon is a firm that maximizes its profits. In this setting, the authors analyze a Stackel-
berg game under three different environmental polices: tax-only, tax-and-subsidy, and a joint
policy that also includes rebates given to consumers who buy products manufactured with
green technologies. The policy maker, as the Stackelberg leader, decides the parameters of
the different policies and the firm chooses the emission-reducing technology and the selling
price. Jaber et al. (2013) investigate the impact of coordination on some environmental mea-
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sures in a manufacturer-retailer setting. In this setting, manufacturer is the only party who is
subject to an environmental policy. Manufacturer’s emissions due to his/her production rate
are penalizedwith a per-unit emission cost and a fixed penalty if the total amount of emissions
exceeds a limit. This combination policy allows for the modeling of a tax policy and a variant
of the cap-and-trade policy. Specifically, as in cap-and-trade policy, a cost is incurredwhen an
upper bound on the emissions is exceeded. However, unlike the typical cap-and-trade policy,
it does not allow for the possibility of gains when the emissions are under the upper bound.
In analyzing the impact of coordination on the environment, the authors look into how the
solution to the integrated problem changes the sum of emissions and penalty costs in com-
parison to independently-made decisions of the parties. They observe over a set of examples
that total system costs reduce with no change in the sum of emissions and penalty costs.
As opposed to Benjaafar et al. (2013), Krass et al. (2013) and Jaber et al. (2013), the
studies of Dong et al. (2014) and Du et al. (2011) consider stochastic demand environments.
Du et al. (2011) analyze a two-echelon system in which the upper echelon, as the permit
supplier, decides the permit selling price, and the lower echelon, as the manufacturer, decides
his/her production quantity. In this system, if the manufacturer needs more carbon allowance,
he/she purchases it from the permit supplier, but does not have the option to sell if he/she
has excess carbon allowance. In the manufacturer-retailer setting considered by Dong et al.
(2014), the retailer decides the order quantity in response to the manufacturer’s decision
regarding the sustainability investment. The manufacturer in this setting is subject to a cap-
and-trade policy, and both the selling and purchasing prices of the unit carbon allowance
are the same. The authors also examine some of the traditional contracting mechanisms and
show that revenue-sharing contracts can be used for coordinating this supply chain system.
In this paper, we consider a buyer–vendor system with deterministic and steady demand
rate in the infinite horizon. Our paper exhibits relative similarities to each of the reviewed
papers that model the existence of an environmental regulation policy in a multi-echelon
setting. However, different from the majority of the papers in this area (i.e., Benjaafar et al.
2013; Krass et al. 2013; Jaber et al. 2013; Du et al. 2011), we focus on coordination within
the context of inventory replenishment decisions, and we consider a cap-and-trade and a tax
policy. We propose coordination mechanisms to align each firm’s objective with the supply
chain’s objective. Dong et al. (2014) is the only paper with a similar focus under a cap-and-
trade policy, but unlike those authors, we assume that both the buyer and the vendor are
subject to the policy, and our modeling allows for cases in which the purchasing price of a
unit carbon allowance is greater than its selling price.
As the world economy becomes increasingly conscious of the environmental concerns, it
is more likely that wewill evidence complex settings where several parties in the supply chain
may be subject to emission policies. In fact, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions reports
California cap-and-trade program and European Union (EU) Emission Trading Scheme as
examples of multi-sector cap-and-trade programs (see Center for Climate and Energy Solu-
tions 2014). Electricity, heat and steam production, oil, iron and steel, cement, glass, pulp and
paper are industries in EU’s Emission Trading System, and electricity, ground transportation,
heating fuels are industries in California’s cap-and-trade program. This obviously indicates
a need for models that analyze multiple parties in the supply chain being subject to emission
policies.
Another distinguishing characteristic of our models is the difference between the purchas-
ing and selling prices of unit carbon allowance, which leads to a piecewise objective function
in both the decentralized and centralized models. Through a careful analysis of the structural
properties of the objective functions, we propose finite-time exact solution procedures for
these optimization problems. Our consideration of the cap-and-trade policy for both parties
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and the difference in carbon trading prices leads to some novel coordination mechanisms
based on carbon credit sharing. We also extend our modeling and analysis to the case of tax
policy. A final contribution of our paper is that for both policies, we investigate the impact of
coordination on the environment in terms of the resulting carbon emissions. Our numerical
analysis for the cap-and-trade policy and our analytical results for the tax policy show that
coordination may not always be good for the environment.
In the next section, we begin with the problem definition and formulation under the two
policies. In Sect. 3, we present our analytical and numerical results for the cap-and-trade
policy. We then continue in Sect. 4 with an analysis for the tax policy. We conclude the paper
in Sect. 5 with a discussion of our findings.
2 Problem definition and notation
We consider a system that consists of a buyer (retailer) and a vendor (manufacturer). The
buyer and the vendor operate to meet the deterministic demand of a single product in the
infinite horizon using a lot-for-lot policy. That is, the quantity produced by the manufacturer
at each setup is equal to the retailer’s ordering lot size. Shortages are not allowed and the
replenishment lead times are zero (or, equivalently, deterministic in this setting). The vendor
incurs a setup cost of Kv monetary units at each production run, and the buyer incurs a fixed
cost of Kb monetary units at each ordering. The vendor and the buyer are subject to cost rates
hv and hb, respectively, for each unit held in the inventory for a unit time. It is important to
note that the joint replenishment decisions in this setting have been previously studied by
Banerjee and Burton (1994) and Lu (1995). In this paper, we model the carbon emissions of
the buyer and the vendor resulting from production- and inventory-related activities, and we
study how replenishment decisions can be coordinated under a cap-and-trade policy and a
tax policy. Table 1 introduces the notation that will be used in our modeling for both policies.
Without any loss of generality, the time unit is taken as a year.
In order to arrive at a coordinated solution for the two-echelon system,we study twomodels
under each policy: the decentralized model and the centralized model. In the decentralized
model, the buyer’s independent replenishment decisions minimizing his/her cost per unit
time determine the vendor’s replenishment lot size. In the centralized model, the buyer’s and
vendor’s costs and constraints are simultaneously taken into account to find a quantity that
minimizes the total system cost per unit time. Using the centralized solution as a benchmark,
we developmechanisms that utilize price discounts, carbon credit sharing, andfixed payments
to coordinate the system.
2.1 Modeling of the different solution approaches under the cap-and-trade policy
Under a cap-and-trade policy, both the buyer and the vendor have carbon caps (i.e., a carbon
emission quota per unit time). They both emit carbon due to production/ordering setups,
inventory holding, and procurement. If the emissions per unit time of one party exceed
his/her cap, then he/she buys carbon credits at a rate of pbc monetary units for one unit carbon
emission. If the emissions per unit time are below the cap, then the excess amount of carbon
credit is sold at a rate of psc monetary units for unit carbon emission (p
s
c ≤ pbc ). Buying and
selling carbon credits can be compared to buying and selling shares in a stock market. The
difference pbc − psc can be considered as the gap between the bid and asking prices for the
allowance of emitting one unit carbon. The particular values of pbc and p
s
c are determined
by the supply and demand for carbon allowances in the market. Nouira et al. (2014) reports
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Kb Fixed cost of ordering
hb Cost of holding one unit inventory for a year
c Unit purchasing cost
fb Fixed amount of carbon emission at each ordering
gb Carbon emission amount due to holding one unit inventory
for a year
eb Carbon emission amount due to unit procurement
Vendor’s parameters
P Production rate (P > D)
Kv Fixed cost per production run
hv Cost of holding one unit inventory for a year
pv Unit production cost
fv Fixed amount of carbon emission at each production setup
gv Carbon emission amount due to holding one unit inventory
for a year
ev Carbon emission amount due to producing one unit
that in most cases pbc > p
s
c due to differences in transaction costs for selling and purchasing
allowances. Table 2 summarizes the additional notation specific to our discussion for the
cap-and-trade policy.
Under a cap-and-trade policy, the buyer’s average annual cost is given by
BC (Q, Xb) =
{
BC1 (Q, Xb) if Xb  0
BC2 (Q, Xb) if Xb > 0,
(1)
where




+ cD − pbc Xb, (2)
and




+ cD − psc Xb. (3)
If the buyer buys carbon credits (i.e., Xb is negative), his/her annual cost function is given
by Expression (2). If the buyer sells carbon credits (i.e., Xb is positive), his/her annual cost
function is given by Expression (3). Note that if the buyer neither sells nor buys carbon credits
(i.e., Xb = 0), then BC1(Q, Xb) = BC2(Q, Xb).










minimizes the buyer’s annual




minimizes his/her annual emissions.
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Table 2 Problem parameters and decision variables under the cap-and-trade policy
Policy parameters
Cb Buyer’s annual carbon emission cap
Cv Vendor’s annual carbon emission cap
pbc Buying price of unit carbon emission
psc Selling price of unit carbon emission
Decision variables
Q Buyer’s order quantity (vendor’s production lot size)
Xb Amount of carbon credit traded by the buyer
Xv Amount of carbon credit traded by the vendor
Xs Amount of carbon credit traded by the system in the centralized model with
carbon credit sharing
Functions and optimal values of decision variables
BC (Q, Xb) Buyer’s average annual costs as a function of Q and Xb
VC (Q, Xv) Vendor’s average annual costs as a function of Q and Xv
TC (Q, Xb, Xv) Total average annual costs as a function of Q, Xb and
Xv (TC (Q, Xb, Xv) = BC (Q, Xb) + VC (Q, Xv))
SC (Q, Xs ) Total average annual costs of the buyer–vendor system in the centralized
model with carbon credit sharing
Q∗d Optimal order quantity as a result of the decentralized model
Q∗c Optimal order quantity as a result of the centralized model
Q∗s Optimal order quantity as a result of the centralized model with carbon credit
sharing
Similar to Expression (1), the vendor’s annual cost is given by
VC (Q, Xv) =
{
VC1 (Q, Xv) if Xv  0
VC2 (Q, Xv) if Xv > 0,
(5)
where




+ pvD − pbc Xv (6)
and




+ pvD − psc Xv. (7)
If the vendor buys carbon credits (i.e., Xv is negative), his/her annual cost can be obtained
by Expression (6), and if he/she sells carbon credits (i.e., Xv is positive), it can be obtained
by Expression (7). If Xv = 0, then VC1(Q, Xv) = VC2(Q, Xv).
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The decentralized model and the corresponding centralized model are then as follows:
Decentralized Model: Centralized Model:
Min BC(Q, Xb) Min TC(Q, Xb, Xv)
s.t. fb DQ + gbQ2 + ebD + Xb = Cb, s.t. fb DQ + gbQ2 + ebD + Xb = Cb,
Q ≥ 0. fvDQ + gvDQ2P + evD + Xv = Cv,
Q ≥ 0.
In the decentralized model presented above, the buyer only considers his/her emission con-
straint to minimize BC(Q, Xb). In the centralized model, the first and the second constraints
belong to the buyer and the vendor, respectively. Since these constraints have to be satisfied
at any feasible solution, with a slight change of notation, we will refer to the buyer’s and the
vendor’s traded amounts of carbon credits for replenishing Q units by Xb(Q) and Xv(Q).
Note that Xb(Q) = Cb − fb DQ − gbQ2 − ebD and Xv(Q) = Cv − fvDQ − gvDQ2P − evD. The
buyer’s optimal order quantity in the optimal solution of the decentralized model, Q∗d , there-
fore, leads to Xb(Q∗d) and Xv(Q∗d) as the traded amounts of carbon credits by the buyer and
the vendor. Similarly, in the optimal solution of the centralized model, the traded amounts of
carbon credit by the buyer and the vendor are given by Xb(Q∗c) and Xv(Q∗c), respectively.
In order for this buyer–vendor system to achieve its maximum supply chain profitability,
we propose coordination mechanisms that entail carbon credit sharing. To this end, we intro-
duce a third model, which we refer to as the “centralized model with carbon credit sharing”.
In this model, it is assumed that if one party has an excess carbon allowance, he/she can make
it available to the other party if that party needs it. Therefore, the average annual costs of the
buyer–vendor system under carbon credit sharing are given by
SC (Q, Xs) =
{
SC1 (Q, Xs) if Xs  0
SC2 (Q, Xs) if Xs > 0,
(9)
where






+ (c + pv)D − pbc Xs, (10)
and






+ (c + pv)D − psc Xs . (11)
Assuming carbon credit sharing is available, the centralized model is as follows:
Centralized Model with Carbon Credit Sharing:
Min SC(Q, Xs)
s.t. ( fb+ fv)DQ +
(gb+ gvDP )Q
2 + (eb + ev)D + Xs = Cb + Cv
Q ≥ 0.
Observe that, for any triplet (Q, Xb(Q), Xv(Q)), there exists a feasible point (Q, Xs(Q))
for the centralized model with carbon credit sharing, where Xs(Q) = Xb(Q) + Xv(Q).
Since pbc ≤ psc , TC (Q, Xb(Q), Xv(Q)) may not be equal to SC (Q, Xs(Q)). In fact, for
any Q ≥ 0 we have SC (Q, Xs(Q)) ≤ TC (Q, Xb(Q), Xv(Q)). More specifically,
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(pbc − psc)min{−Xb(Q), Xv(Q)} if Xb(Q) < 0 and Xv(Q) > 0,
(pbc − psc)min{Xb(Q),−Xv(Q)} if Xb(Q) > 0 and Xv(Q) < 0,
0 o.w.
(12)
The above expression implies that when pbc > p
s
c , there exists a difference between the
total average annual costs of the twomodels (centralizedmodelswith orwithout carbon credit
sharing)when one party needs to purchase carbon allowances and the other one requires fewer
permits at the traded ordering lot size. If both parties need to purchase carbon allowances,
or if both parties have excess allowances to sell, then there is no difference between the
objective function values of the two models. It follows due to Expression (12) that we have
SC
(
Q∗s , Xs(Q∗s )
) ≤ TC (Q∗c , Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c)) at the optimal solutions of the twomodels.
Since carbon credit sharing has the potential to increase supply chain profitability further,
we consider SC
(
Q∗s , Xs(Q∗s )
)
as the least possible cost that the buyer–vendor system can
achieve. Therefore, we use the solution of the centralized model with carbon credit sharing
as a benchmark to propose a coordinated solution. In the next section, we start with analyzing
the decentralized model and the centralized model with carbon credit sharing, and provide
solution algorithms.
2.2 Modeling of the different solution approaches under the tax policy
An external carbon tax is applied by regulatory agencies, and a linear tax schedule is adopted.
That is, the buyer and the vendor pay a monetary amount for each unit of carbon emitted. We
consider a general case in which the buyer’s and the vendor’s tax rates are different, allow-
ing for settings where the parties operate in different geographical locations (e.g., different
countries) and/or in different industries. Table 3 summarizes the additional notation specific
to our discussion for the tax policy.
Table 3 Problem parameters and decision variables under the tax policy
Policy parameters
tb Carbon tax paid by the buyer for a unit emission
tv Carbon tax paid by the vendor for a unit emission
Decision variables
Q Buyer’s order quantity (vendor’s production lot size)
Functions and optimal values of decision variables
BC(Q) Buyer’s average annual costs as a function of Q
VC(Q) Vendor’s average annual costs as a function of Q
TC(Q) Total average annual costs as a function of Q (TC(Q) = BC(Q) + VC(Q))
BT (Q): Average annual tax paid by the buyer as a function of order size Q
VT (Q): Average annual tax paid by the vendor as a function of order size Q
TT (Q): Average annual tax paid by the buyer–vendor system as a function of order
size Q (T T (Q) = BT (Q) + VT (Q))
Q∗d Optimal order quantity as a result of the decentralized model
Q∗c Optimal order quantity as a result of the centralized model
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In the decentralized model, the buyer solves the following replenishment problem to
decide the order quantity that minimizes his/her costs:
min BC(Q) = (Kb + tb fb)D
Q
+ (hb + tbgb)Q
2
+ (c + tbeb)D
Q ≥ 0,
where tb fb is the emission tax paid per replenishment, tbgb is the emission tax paid per unit
held in inventory per unit time, and tbeb is the emission tax paid per unit ordered by the buyer.
Since BT (Q) = tb fb DQ + tbgbQ2 +tbebD, it turns out that BC(Q) = KbDQ + hbQ2 +cD+BT (Q).
The vendor’s average annual cost as a function of Q is given by
VC(Q) = (Kv + tv fv)D
Q
+ (hv + tvgv)QD
2P
+ (pv + tvev)D, (13)
where tv fv is the emission tax paid per production run, tvgv is the emission tax paid per
unit held in inventory per unit time, and tvev is the emission tax paid per unit produced
by the vendor. Since V T (Q) = tv fvDQ + tvgvQD2P + tvevD, it turns out that VC(Q) =
KvD
Q + hvQD2P + pvD + V T (Q).
In the centralized model, the order quantity that minimizes the total cost of the system
(i.e, the total cost of the buyer and the vendor) is determined. In mathematical terms, the
following problem is solved.








+ (c + pv + tbeb + tvev)D
Q ≥ 0.
3 Analysis of the solution approaches under the cap-and-trade policy
In this section, we provide an analysis of the decentralized model and the centralized model
with carbon credit sharing to find Q∗d and Q∗s . Since the objective functions in the two
models exhibit piecewise forms, we propose algorithmic solutions based on some structural
properties of the two problems. The proofs of all results will be presented in the “Appendix”.
3.1 Decentralized model
As implied by Expression (1), BC(Q, Xb) is given by either BC1(Q, Xb) or BC2(Q, Xb).
In a feasible solution of the decentralized model, the buyer trades Xb(Q) units of carbon
credits. Therefore, for a feasible solution pair of Q and Xb(Q), we have








+ (c + pbc eb)D − pbcCb. (14)
Note that BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function of Q with a unique minimizer at
Q∗d1 =
√
2(Kb + pbc fb)D
hb + pbc gb
. (15)
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Likewise, for a feasible solution pair of Q and Xb(Q), BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) can be rewritten as








+ (c + psceb)D − pscCb. (16)
BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) is also a strictly convex function with a unique minimizer at
Q∗d2 =
√
2(Kb + psc fb)D
hb + pscgb
. (17)
Lemma 1 If (Cb − ebD) ≤ √2gb fbD, then the buyer does not sell carbon credits at any
order quantity, that is Xb(Q) ≤ 0 for all Q, and Q∗d = Q∗d1.
Lemma 1 and its proof imply that if the annual cap is smaller than even the minimum
annual emission possible by ordering decisions, then regardless of what quantity is ordered,
the buyer has to purchase carbon credits. As discussed in Sect. 2, when Xb(Q) = 0, the
buyer neither purchases nor sells carbon credits. If (Cb − ebD)2 ≥ 2gb fbD, there are two
order quantities, which we refer to as Q1 and Q2, satisfying Xb(Q) = 0. In terms of the
problem parameters, these quantities are given by
Q1 = Cb − ebD −
√




Q2 = Cb − ebD +
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD
gb
. (19)
If (Cb − ebD)2 > 2gb fbD, we take Q2 as the larger root, i.e., Q2 > Q1.
The results in the seven lemmas (Lemmas 2–8) and the two corollaries (Corollaries 4 and
5) presented in the “Appendix” lead us to the different possible solutions that can happen in
case of (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD. These results, jointly with Lemma 1, yield the optimal
solution algorithm, Algorithm 1. Based on Lemmas 2–8 and Corollaries 4–5 we establish
the fact that the ordinal relation between fbhb and Kbgb is important. Specifically, we show
step by step that if fbhb = Kbgb, then Q∗d = Q∗d2, and the optimal solution in the other
cases (i.e., fbhb < Kbgb and fbhb > Kbgb) depends on the ordering among Q1, Q2, Q∗d1,
and Q∗d2. We present Algorithm 1 next.
Algorithm 1: Solution of the Decentralized Model
1. If (Cb − ebD) ≤ √2gb fbD, then set Q∗d = Q∗d1.
2. If (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD, then do the following:
(a) If fbhb = Kbgb, set Q∗d = Q∗d2.
(b) If fbhb < Kbgb, and
i. if Q2 ≤ Q∗d1, set Q∗d = Q∗d1,
ii. else,
A. if Q2 ≥ Q∗d2, set Q∗d = Q∗d2,
B. if Q2 < Q∗d2, set Q∗d = Q2.
(c) If fbhb > Kbgb, and
i. if Q∗d1 ≤ Q1, set Q∗d = Q∗d1,
ii. else,
A. if Q∗d2 ≥ Q1, set Q∗d = Q∗d2,
B. if Q∗d2 < Q1, set Q∗d = Q1.
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Theorem 1 Algorithm 1 gives the optimal solution to the retailer’s replenishment problem
formulated in the decentralized model.
Recall from Corollary 4 the three possible orderings among Q1, Q2, Q∗d1, and Q∗d2 in the
case of (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb < Kbgb. Theorem 1 and its proof imply that if
Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 < Q∗d2, then Q∗d = Q∗d1; if Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 ≤ Q2, then Q∗d = Q∗d2; if
Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2 < Q∗d2, then Q∗d = Q2. Similarly, in the case of (Cb − ebD) >
√
2gb fbD
and fbhb > Kbgb, there are three possible orderings among Q1, Q2, Q∗d1, and Q∗d2, as stated
in Corollary 5. If Q1 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q∗d1 < Q2, then Q∗d = Q∗d2; if Q∗d2 < Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2,
then Q∗d = Q1; if Q∗d2 < Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q2, then Q∗d = Q∗d1. Theorem 1 has a further
implication in terms of the sensitivity of the optimal order quantity to changes in Cb. We
present this result in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 Let us assume that the cap is increased above its current value Cb.
• If fbhb = Kbgb, then optimal order quantity Q∗d does not change, and its value is given
by Q∗d1.• If fbhb < Kbgb, Q∗d either stays the same or increases (i.e., Q∗d is nondecreasing in Cb).• If fbhb > Kbgb, Q∗d either stays the same or decreases (i.e., Q∗d is nonincreasing in Cb).
The above corollary is presented without a proof. However, a formal proof would be based on
Lemma 1, Lemma 5, Corollary 4, Corollary 5, Theorem 1, and the fact that Q2 is increasing
in Cb and Q1 is decreasing in Cb. Let us define Q′1 and Q′2 as the two quantities that satisfy
Xb(Q) = 0 under the increased value of Cb. We have Q′1 < Q1 and Q′2 > Q2. For
example, in an instance of the problem where (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb < Kbgb,
if Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2 < Q∗d2 at the current value ofCb, Corollary 4 implies that Q∗d = Q2 and
either one of the following two orderings happens ifCb is increased: Q′1 < Q∗d1 < Q′2 < Q∗d2
or Q′1 < Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 ≤ Q′2. In the former case, the new optimal order quantity is Q′2, which
is greater than Q2. In the latter case, the new optimal order quantity is Q∗d2, which again is
greater than Q2. Following a similar reasoning for each possible case of the problem leads
to Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 is significant for a policy maker to foresee what kind of an effect a change
in Cb will have on the quantity traded at each dispatch. It also suggests that knowing how
the ratio of fixed ordering cost to inventory holding cost rate (i.e., Kbhb ) compares to the ratio
of fixed carbon emission amount at each ordering to carbon emission rate due to inventory






, increasing the cap
may result in a fall in the quantity traded at each dispatch.
Next, we proceed with a similar analysis for the centralized model with carbon credit
sharing.
3.2 Centralized model with carbon credit sharing
In a feasible solution of the centralized model with carbon credit sharing, the system trades
Xs(Q) units of carbon credits,where Xs(Q) = Cb+Cv− ( fb+ fv)DQ −
(gb+ gvDP )Q
2 −(eb+ev)D.
For this pair of order quantity and traded amount of carbon credits, it turns out that
SC1 (Q, Xs(Q)) =
(














c + pv + pbc (eb + ev)
)
D − pbc (Cb + Cv). (20)
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Kb + Kv + pbc ( fb + fv)
)
D




A similar expression can be derived for SC2 (Q, Xs(Q)) and is given by
SC2 (Q, Xs(Q)) =
(












+ (c + pv + psc(eb + ev)) D − psc(Cb + Cv). (22)




Kb + Kv + psc( fb + fv)
)
D




Expression (9) is similar to Expression (1) in its structural properties. Therefore, results
similar to those proved in Sect. 3.1 for the decentralized model also hold for the centralized






( fb + fv)D, then
the buyer–vendor system does not sell carbon credits at any order quantity, that is Xs(Q) ≤ 0






( fb + fv)D, we have Xs(Q) = 0
at the following two values of the order quantity:
Q3 =
Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D −
√





Cb + Cv − (eb + ev)D +
√









( fb + fv)D and Q3 < Q < Q4.
We propose the following algorithm to obtain the optimal solution of the centralized
model with carbon credit sharing. A detailed proof will not be presented because it follows
the same lines as Theorem 1’s proof and makes use of similar results (i.e., Lemma 1, Lemma
5, Corollary 4, and Corollary 5) that set a foundation for Theorem 1.
Algorithm 2: Solution of the Centralized Model with Carbon Credit Sharing






( fb + fv)D, then set Q∗s = Q∗c1.






( fb + fv)D, then do the following:
(a) If ( fb + fv)(hb + hvDP ) = (Kb + Kv)(gb + gvDP ), set Q∗s = Q∗c2.
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(b) If ( fb + fv)(hb + hvDP ) < (Kb + Kv)(gb + gvDP ), and
i. if Q4 ≤ Q∗c1, set Q∗s = Q∗c1,
ii. else,
A. if Q4 ≥ Q∗c2, set Q∗s = Q∗c2,
B. if Q4 < Q∗c2, set Q∗s = Q4.
(c) If ( fb + fv)(hb + hvDP ) > (Kb + Kv)(gb + gvDP ), and
(i.) if Q∗c1 ≤ Q3, set Q∗s = Q∗c1,
(ii.) else,
A. if Q∗c2 ≥ Q3, set Q∗s = Q∗c2,
B. if Q∗c2 < Q3, set Q∗s = Q3.
3.3 Coordination mechanisms
In this section, we present coordination mechanisms that help the buyer–vendor system to
arrive at the system optimal solution by making the most efficient use of carbon credits.
These coordination mechanisms assume that vendor has full information about the ordering
behavior of the buyer, and the buyer orders from the current vendor as long as his/her costs as
a result of the coordinated solution are not more than those under the decentralized solution.
The novelty of the proposed coordination mechanisms is that they make use of carbon credit
sharing. Recall that in this setting, the purchasing price of one unit carbon credit is greater
than or equal to its selling price (i.e., pbc ≥ psc). In settings where pbc > psc , and one party is
selling carbon credits while the other party is purchasing them, the system is actually losing
an opportunity to profit more due to the monetary value that the purchasing party pays to
intermediary agencies (i.e., pbc − psc per unit carbon credit purchased). The lost opportunity
is quantified in Expression (12). Therefore, the proposed coordination mechanisms, as part
of sharing the extra benefits of the centralized solutions, entail the party who has extra carbon
credits to pass them to the other party, who would otherwise purchase them at a higher price
in the market. This way, we minimize the system’s need to purchase carbon credits, and
hence, to pay intermediary agencies.
While carbon credit sharing may lead to reduced overall costs, it may increase or decrease
the total annual emissions in comparison to a coordinated solution that does not allow carbon
credit sharing. The examples in Table 4 are illustrative of these two cases.
In Examples 7 and 8, carbon credit sharing reduces total average annual costs. In Example
7, the optimal order quantity of the centralized model without carbon credit sharing (Q∗c )
is 235.5, and this quantity leads to 705.8425 as the total average annual emissions. The
optimal order quantity of the centralized model with carbon credit sharing (Q∗s ) is 251.5,
which results in a value of 708.145 as the total average annual emissions. While Example 7
is illustrative of a case in which carbon credit sharing increases the emissions of the buyer–
vendor system, Example 8 exemplifies a complementary case. Specifically, in Example 8, the
total average annual emissions under the optimal solution of the centralized model without
carbon credit sharing is 721.987,which reduces to 715.322 due to carbon credit sharing. These
two examples show that the impact of carbon credit sharing on the environment is dependent
on the specific setting; however, the total costs either stay the same or reduce due to carbon
credit sharing (i.e., SC
(
Q∗s , Xs(Q∗s )
) ≤ TC (Q∗c , Xb(Q∗c), Xv(Q∗c))). Therefore, in the
proposed coordination mechanisms, SC
(
Q∗s , Xs(Q∗s )
)
will be considered as the minimum
system costs that can be achieved. Before we introduce these coordination mechanisms,
we present the following result, which is crucial for understanding why these mechanisms
work.
123

















































































































































































Ann Oper Res (2017) 250:487–519 501
Proposition 1 BC (Q, Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function of Q.
Observe that if both parties would not sell carbon credits under the system optimal quantity
Q∗s (i.e., Xb(Q∗s ) ≤ 0 and Xv(Q∗s ) ≤ 0), or if both parties would not purchase car-
bon credits under the system optimal quantity Q∗s (i.e., Xb(Q∗s ) ≥ 0 and Xv(Q∗s ) ≥ 0),
then carbon credit sharing would not bring any benefit to the system. Therefore, in those
cases we rely on traditional coordination mechanisms. In fact, an implication of Propo-
sition 1 is that quantity discounts with economies or diseconomies of scale coordinates
the buyer–vendor system. Specifically, if Q∗s > Q∗d , then under a per unit discount of
d = BC(Q∗s ,Xb(Q∗s ))−BC(Q∗d ,Xb(Q∗d ))D for order quantities greater than or equal to Q∗s , the
buyer would be indifferent to whether Q∗d or Q∗s were ordered. If Q∗s < Q∗d , under a per unit
discount of the same amount for order quantities less than or equal to Q∗s , the buyer would
be indifferent to whether Q∗d or Q∗s were ordered.
In cases where one party would sell carbon credits while the other party would buy
carbon credits under the centralized optimumquantity,we propose the following coordination
mechanisms:
CM1: If Xb(Q∗s ) ≤ 0, Xv(Q∗s ) ≥ 0, pbc ×min
{−Xb(Q∗s ), Xv(Q∗s ) } ≥ BC(Q∗s , Xb(Q∗s ))−
BC(Q∗d , Xb(Q∗d)), and
– if Q∗d < Q∗s , then for order quantities greater than or equal to Q∗s ,
– if Q∗d > Q∗s , then for order quantities less than or equal to Q∗s ,
the vendor gives Y = min {−Xb(Q∗s ), Xv(Q∗s ) } carbon credits for free to the buyer and the
buyer makes a fixed payment of BC(Q∗d , Xb(Q∗d)) + pbc × Y − BC(Q∗s , Xb(Q∗s )) to the
vendor.
CM2: If Xb(Q∗s ) ≤ 0, Xv(Q∗s ) ≥ 0, pbc ×min
{−Xb(Q∗s ), Xv(Q∗s ) } < BC(Q∗s , Xb(Q∗s ))−
BC(Q∗d , Xb(Q∗d)), and
– if Q∗d < Q∗s , then for order quantities greater than or equal to Q∗s ,
– if Q∗d > Q∗s , then for order quantities less than or equal to Q∗s ,
the vendor gives Y = min {−Xb(Q∗s ), Xv(Q∗s ) } carbon credits for free to the buyer and a
per unit discount of d = [BC(Q∗s , Xb(Q∗s ))− BC(Q∗d , Xb(Q∗d))− pbc ×Y ]/D for all items
in the lot.
CM3: If Xb(Q∗s ) ≥ 0, Xv(Q∗s ) ≤ 0, and
– if Q∗d < Q∗s , then for order quantities greater than or equal to Q∗s ,
– if Q∗d > Q∗s , then for order quantities less than or equal to Q∗s ,
the buyer gives Y = min {Xb(Q∗s ),−Xv(Q∗s ) } carbon credits for free to the vendor and the
vendor gives a per unit discount of d = [BC(Q∗s , Xb(Q∗s ))−BC(Q∗d , Xb(Q∗d))+ psc×Y ]/D
to the buyer for all items in the lot.
The first and the second coordination mechanisms (i.e., CM1 and CM2) apply to cases in
which the buyerwould buy carbon creditswhile the vendorwould sell carbon credits under the
centralized optimum solution. The expressionmin
{−Xb(Q∗s ), Xv(Q∗s ) } refers to the amount
of carbon credits the vendor can provide to the buyer. CM1 and CM2 differ in whether the
monetary value of this amount in the market (i.e., pbc ×min
{−Xb(Q∗s ), Xv(Q∗s ) }) is greater
or less than the buyer’s loss from using the centralized solution (i.e., BC(Q∗s , Xb(Q∗s )) −
BC(Q∗d , Xb(Q∗d))). In cases where the value of carbon credits given by the vendor to the
buyer exceeds the buyer’s loss, then CM1 applies, and the buyer returns the extra value of
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Table 5 Numerical instances to illustrate the proposed coordination mechanisms
Example
index
Instances with D = 50, c = 12, pv = 8
Kb hb p
b
c Cb fb gb eb Kv P hv fv gv ev Cv
9 900 1 7.5 300 40 0.5 5 1000 150 0.5 135 0.25 7 450
10 90 2 7.5 345 90 1 5 1000 75 0.8 60 1.75 6 400
11 330 3.2 2.5 300 90 0.5 4.5 100 55 3 95 0.25 6 350
Table 6 Solutions of instances in Table 5
Example
index
Q∗d Q∗s Xb(Q∗s ) Xv(Q∗s ) Coordination mechanism
9 158.944 251.425 −20.811 62.677 For Q ≥ 251.425, the vendor gives
20.811 carbon credits to the buyer,
who in return, makes a fixed
payment of 75.291
10 89.737 113.186 −1.351 7.470 For Q ≥ 113.186, the vendor gives
1.351 carbon credits to the buyer
and a per unit discount of 0.259
11 110.195 107.345 6.243 −6.448 For Q ≤ 107.345, buyer gives 6.243
carbon credits to the vendor, who in
return, gives a per unit discount of 0.253
carbon credits as a fixed payment to the vendor. If it is less than the buyer’s loss, then CM2
applies, and the vendor further gives an all-units discount to the buyer to compensate his/her
remaining loss. CM3 applies to cases in which the vendor would buy carbon credits while
the buyer would sell carbon credits under the centralized optimum solution. In this case, the
buyer gives the vendor the carbon credits he/she needs, but in return receives a higher amount
of per unit discount. The per unit discount amount is such that it compensates the buyer for
his/her losses if he/she orders the centralized optimum quantity in addition to the monetary
value of carbon credits he/she agrees to give to the vendor.
In Table 5, parameters of three instances are presented. In Table 6, a summary of their
decentralized and centralized solutions as well as the coordinating mechanisms are reported.
Examples 9, 10, and 11 are illustrative of CM1, CM2, and CM3, respectively.
3.4 The impact of coordination on the environment under the cap-and-trade
policy
To understand the impact of coordination on the environment, we numerically compare the
average annual emissions resulting from the decentralized model and the centralized model
with carbon credit sharing. For this purpose, the following additional pieces of notation are
used.
T E(Q): Average annual emissions of the system if order size is Q units
R: Ratio of average annual system emissions resulting from the two models
The ratio R is a performance measure on the system’s environmental quality under the cen-
tralized model with carbon credit sharing compared to its environmental performance under
the decentralized model. In mathematical terms,
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Table 7 Numerical instances to illustrate the impact of coordination on emissions
Example
index
Instances with D = 30, psc = 1.5, eb = 1, P = 50, hv = 1.2,Kb = 40, fb = 20,
gb = 0.5, ev = 1.5, Cv = 200







12 500 80 120 0.35 1.5 2.5 43.205 117.041 0.813
13 500 80 1800 0.35 1.5 2.5 43.205 276.488 0.274
14 8000 80 120 12 1.5 2.5 43.205 153.123 2.044
15 500 80 120 0.35 10 2.5 19.766 61.793 0.560
16 500 80 120 0.35 10 3.5 19.766 61.793 0.560
17 500 40 120 0.35 1.5 2.5 44.313 117.041 0.822
18 500 120 120 0.35 1.5 2.5 43.205 117.041 0.813




















2 + (eb + ev)D
. (26)
A value of R > 1 would be due to T E(Q∗s ) > T E(Q∗d), implying that the coordinated solu-
tion is not good for the environment. Similarly, a value of R < 1 implies that coordination
is better for the environment than the uncoordinated solution. In Table 7, we present some
instances of the problem to illustrate possible values of R. We would like to note that we have
studied the effect of each parameter on R over an extensive numerical analysis; however,
there are so many interactions between the problem parameters that there is no generalizable
result regarding how R changes with respect to varying values of a certain parameter.
Example 12 in Table 7 can be considered as the base instance aroundwhich other examples
are generated. Example 13 illustrates an instance in which R is very small (i.e., 0.274) and
Example 14 illustrates an instance in which R is very large (i.e., 2.044). In our experimenta-
tion, we have identified that most of the instances for which R is very large have extremely
high Kv values. Because, when Kv is extremely high, the manufacturer wants to make less
frequent setups and produce in larger quantities to save from average annual setup costs, and
this results in higher average annual carbon emissions in the centralized model with carbon
credit sharing. However, we would like to note that we have also observed instances without
extremely high Kv values to also have R > 1. In Examples 15 and 16, the inventory holding
cost rate of the buyer is so large that in both the decentralized and centralized models, it is
only economically appealing to order in small lot sizes and more frequently. It turns out that
in both instances, the buyer in the decentralized solution and the system in the centralized
solution sell carbon credits. Therefore, even if the buying price of a unit carbon emission is
different among these two instances, it does not have an effect on the optimum solutions.
Examples 17 and 18 are different than the base instance in the buyer’s average annual carbon
emission cap, Cb. In Example 17, the buyer’s annual cap is so small that he/she has to buy
carbon allowances in the decentralized solution. In Example 12, on the other hand, the buyer
has extra allowances to sell. Therefore, even if the buyer’s annual cap is increased further
in Example 18, it does not have an effect on the solution (i.e., the optimal solutions are the
same as in the base instance).
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4 Analysis of the solution approaches under the tax policy
In this section, we provide an analysis of the decentralized model and the centralized model
under the carbon tax mechanism to find the cost-minimizing order quantities Q∗d and Q∗c ,
respectively. We also present some properties related to Q∗d , Q∗c and average annual tax
amounts of the buyer and the vendor.






As the average annual taxes are linearly proportional to the average annual emissions, Qtd
also minimizes the latter.




2(Kb + tb fb)D
hb + tbgb . (28)
Observe that as tb increases, the cost-minimizing order quantity Q∗d approaches the emis-
sion optimal order quantity Qtd . We use Proposition 2 to find the minimum average annual
cost of the buyer under the decentralized model and present it in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 The average annual cost of the buyer under the optimal solution of the decen-
tralized model is given by
BC(Q∗d) =
√
2(Kb + tb fb)D(hb + tbgb) + (c + tbeb)D. (29)
Similarly, the vendor’s average annual cost under the decentralized model (VC(Q∗d)) can
be found by plugging Q∗d into Expression (13). Also, the total average annual cost of the
system under the decentralized model is TC(Q∗d) = BC(Q∗d) + VC(Q∗d).




2(tb fb + tv fv)D
tbgb + tvgvDP
. (30)
Note that Qtc also minimizes the average annual emissions if tb = tv .




2(Kb + Kv + tb fb + tv fv)D
hb + tbgb + (hv + tvgv) DP
. (31)




, which is the minimizer of V T (Q) (i.e., the
vendor’s emission optimal order quantity). Similarly, as tb gets larger, Q∗c approaches to√
2 fb D
gb
, which is the buyer’s emission optimal order quantity. In the next corollary, we present
the average annual cost of the system resulting from the optimal solution of the centralized
model.
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2(Kb + Kv + tb fb + tv fv)D
[
hb + tbgb + (hv + tvgv)D
P
]
+ (c + pv + tbeb + tvev)D.
(32)
Similarly, the buyer’s average annual cost (BC(Q∗c )) and the vendor’s average annual cost
(VC(Q∗c )) under the centralized model can be found by plugging Q∗c into BC(Q) and in
Expression (13), respectively. In the next proposition, we present a further property of Q∗d
and Q∗c .







The above proposition implies that any coordination mechanism should take into account
both the case of Q∗d > Q∗c and the case of Q∗d < Q∗c . As an example, a per unit discount of
BC(Q∗c)−BC(Q∗d)






c , and less than
or equal to Q∗c if Q∗d > Q∗c would coordinate the system.
Until this point, we have taken the perspective of the buyer–vendor system in comparing
the different solution approaches. We have obtained results on how the buyer’s and the
vendor’s annual costs differ under the decentralized and centralized solutions. In the next
two propositions, we take the perspective of the regulator or the government who collects
taxes. We compare the average annual amount of taxes collected by the government under
the decentralized and centralized solutions.





(i) If tb fb+tv fv
tbgb+ tv gvDP
 Kb+tb fbhb+tbgb , then the government collects no fewer taxes in the centralized
solution than it does in the decentralized solution.
(ii) If tb fb+tv fv
tbgb+ tv gvDP
 Kb+Kv+tb fb+tv fv
hb+tbgb+(hv+tvgv) DP
, then the government collects no fewer taxes in the
decentralized solution than it does in the centralized solution.





(i) If tb fb+tv fv
tbgb+ tv gvDP
 Kb+tb fbhb+tbgb , then the government collects more taxes in the centralized
solution than it does in the decentralized solution.
(ii) If tb fb+tv fv
tbgb+ tv gvDP
 Kb+Kv+tb fb+tv fv
hb+tbgb+(hv+tvgv) DP
, then the government collects more taxes in the
decentralized solution than it does in the centralized solution.
Proof The proof follows a similar structure to the proof of Proposition 4 and is omitted. 
Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 imply that there are cases in which coordination of the buyer–
vendor system may not be good from the perspective of a government or a regulator who
wants to increase total annual average taxes collected. In Table 8, we present some numerical
instances to illustrate our analytical results for the buyer–vendor coordination problem under
the tax policy. In the last two columns of the table, we report the decentralized and the
centralized optimum quantities. In Table 9, we present the buyer’s, vendor’s, and system’s
average annual taxes resulting from the decentralized and the centralized solutions to the
examples in Table 8. Examples 19, 20, and 21 are to illustrate the first part of Proposition 4.
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Table 8 Numerical instances for illustrating analytical results under the tax mechanism (hv = 1.5, c = 9,
pv = 6, eb = 5 and ev = 6 in all instances)
Example
index





19 90 100 200 600 2 30 60 0.2 0.75 2 3 139.642 180.043
20 50 100 700 600 2 60 90 1 0.75 2 3 143.178 169.605
21 50 100 700 600 2 60 90 1 0.6 2 3 143.178 172.949
22 50 100 40 60 2 70 90 1 0.75 2 3 67.082 93.171
23 90 100 200 600 2 100 120 0.15 0.75 2 3 176.930 207.693
24 50 100 40 60 2 30 120 3 2 2 3 35.355 66.525
25 40 60 400 60 2 300 60 0.6 0.2 4 2 170.561 158.523
26 500 600 800 60 1.7 750 310 1 0.75 2 3 788.430 694.299
27 550 600 450 70 2 300 80 1.7 0.2 4 2 454.148 442.915
28 50 60 900 60 1.7 60 90 1 0.75 2 3 166.034 140.642
29 40 90 800 60 1.7 60 90 1 0.7 2 3 141.039 137.361
30 500 600 800 60 1.7 400 90 1 0.75 2 3 657.596 531.774




























19 966.599 1877.399 2843.997 966.001 1892.272 2858.274
20 685.084 1074.826 1759.91 704.982 1075 1779.981
21 685.084 1058.718 1743.802 707.642 1055.885 1763.526
22 671.432 1138.98 1810.412 668.302 1097.303 1765.605
23 1028.275 1982.265 3010.539 1017.82 1986.289 3004.109
24 690.919 1462.15 2153.069 744.670 1270.363 2015.033
25 1286.098 530.884 1816.982 1293.023 531.416 1824.439
26 6739.688 10,328.93 17,068.62 6774.525 10,320.65 17,095.17
27 13,997.37 6877.03 20,874.4 13,996.04 6879.885 20,875.92
28 702.172 1136.966 1839.138 683.304 1127.84 1811.144
29 575.072 862.393 1437.465 572.305 862.727 1435.032
30 6265.872 9281.789 16,087.66 6283.973 9752.405 16,036.38
As it can be observed from Table 9, in these examples, the government collects more taxes in
the centralized solution than it does in the decentralized solution (i.e., T T (Q∗c) > T T (Q∗d)).
These examples differ in how the individual parties’ average annual taxes change in the
two solutions. For example, in Example 19, while BT (Q∗d) > BT (Q∗c) and V T (Q∗d) <
V T (Q∗c), in Example 20, we have BT (Q∗d) < BT (Q∗c) and V T (Q∗d) < VT (Q∗c). The
next three examples (Examples 22, 23, 24) illustrate the second part of Proposition 4. In
these examples, the government collects more taxes in the decentralized solution than it
does in the centralized solution. Likewise, Examples 25, 26, and 27 illustrate the first part
of Proposition 5. As evident in Table 9, in these examples, the government collects more
taxes in the centralized solution. Finally, the second part of Proposition 5 is illustrated with
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Examples 28, 29, and 30, in which the government collects more average annual taxes in the
decentralized solution.
We would like to note that, in Table 8, the instances in which T T (Q∗c) > T T (Q∗d)
coincide with the cases where coordination is not good for the environment. On the other
hand, instances with T T (Q∗c) < T T (Q∗d) are illustrative of the cases in which coordination
is good for the environment.
5 Conclusion
There is growing recognition of the potential damage of global climate change caused by
human activities. Reducing greenhouse gases through some environmental regulations is
possible; however, thesemeasures impose costs on the economy, and the efficiencyof different
policies in the long run is uncertain. In this paper, we investigated the impact of supply chain
coordination on environmental measures under two emission-regulation policies: cap-and-
trade and tax. We performed our analysis over a buyer–vendor system facing deterministic
demand in the infinite horizon. Our findings show that how the buyer and the vendor behave
in terms of the contractual agreements they engage in has a significant effect on the resulting
emissions under both policies.We conclude that in general, supply chain coordinationmay or
may not be good for the environment, depending on the circumstances, as opposed to having
no coordination under a specific policy. Furthermore, the impact of coordinated decisions in
comparison to independent decisions depends on the parties’ particular production/inventory-
related parameters, whichmeans that coordination among firms is a source of unpredictability
for the policy maker in designing regulations. In case of cap-and-trade policy, one exception
was when the vendor’s fixed replenishment cost is extremely high. In our experimentation,
we consistently observed that in such cases, coordination between the parties results in more
system emissions than the uncoordinated solution does.
We also explored the added flexibility of the cap-and-trade policy for firms to share their
carbon credits and we proposed novel coordination mechanisms based on carbon credit
sharing. This flexibility has the potential to reduce supply chain costs even further under
coordination but may sometimes contribute to higher carbon emissions. Supply chain coor-
dination is an important aid for companies in reducing overall system costs, and carbon
credit sharing as part of coordination mechanisms may help companies in reducing the cost
of compliance to the cap-and-trade policy. Our results show that whether this comes at the
expense of increased carbon emissions in comparison to coordination with no carbon credit
sharing, again, depends on the particular parameters of the buyer and the vendor. This result
suggests that the benefits of carbon credit sharing in terms of costs should be weighed against
a possible increase in carbon emissions, and the policy maker should carefully determine the
terms for the private transfer of carbon credits among firms.
Our review of the production/inventorymodels in the operations research and themanage-
ment science literature revealed that number of studies considering environmental policies
within the context of different problems in multi-echelon settings is limited. We would like
to note that our paper is the first one to study coordination in a setting where multiple parties
in the supply chain are subject to environmental policies. Furthermore, our modeling for the
cap-and-trade policy allows for the purchasing price of unit carbon allowance to be larger
than its selling price. The difference in carbon trading prices leads to challenging optimiza-
tion problems under both independent and integrated decisions. A contribution of this paper
is to propose finite-time exact solution procedures for these problems. In our modeling for
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the tax policy, we also aimed for a generalization by allowing the manufacturer’s and the
retailer’s carbon tax rates to be different, which may happen if the parties are in different
industries or in different geographical locations. A future work could be to study other prob-
lems such as facility location, transportation mode selection, etc. under the environmental
policiesmodeled herein.We considered a deterministic-demand production-inventory setting
with a lot-for-lot policy in place. It is also worthwhile to extend the questions of interest and
the analysis in this paper to more complex settings by modeling different dispatch policies
or stochasticity of demand.
In case of cap-and-trade policy, our consideration of the difference between the selling and
purchasing prices of unit carbon allowance led us to some novel coordination mechanisms
based on carbon credit sharing (i.e., carbon-credit sharing along with fixed payments, or
carbon credit sharing along with quantity discounts). In case of tax policy, we showed that
classical quantity discounts can be used for channel coordination. Our study assumed that
retail price of the item is fixed and demand is independent of the retail price. Weng (1995)
showed that when the retail price is a decision variable and demand is dependent on the retail
price, a quantity discount policy is not sufficient for coordination. A further generalization
of our study could be to consider a dependency between demand and retail price, which we
believe may necessitate the use of different coordination mechanisms.
In this paper, we also obtained some results which can be helpful for a policy maker
in designing environmental regulations. Specifically, in Corollary 1, we showed how the
retailer’s order quantity changeswith his/her cap and how the change depends on the retailer’s
parameters (i.e., fixed cost and fixed emissions at each ordering, cost rate and emissions rate
related to inventory holding). In Propositions 4 and 5, we provided a comparison of the taxes
the government collects in case of centralized and decentralized decision-making between
the buyer and the vendor, based on a characterization of their parameters. Our objective in
this paper was to provide a thorough analysis for the cap-and-trade policy and the tax policy
individually. A comparison of these policies within the context of coordination remains
a future research. This comparison may investigate how the total emissions change after
coordination under a cap-and-trade policy versus under a tax policy. However, we believe
obtaining general results requires an extensive numerical study, and the problem instances
should be generated carefully to consider equivalent cap-and-trade and tax policies. That
is, under the appropriate parameters of the cap-and-trade policy and the corresponding tax
policy, the average annual costs and the emissions should be similar in the decentralized
solution for a fair comparison.
In analyzing the impact of the coordinated solution on total emissions, we defined a mea-
surewhichwe referred to as R in the paper (ratio of average annual system emissions resulting
from the optimal solution of the centralized model to that of the decentralized model). We
showed that there are instances of the problem under which R > 1 for both the cap-and-trade
and the tax policies. The objective functions of the centralized and decentralizedmodels were
cost minimization. Therefore, our proposed coordinated solutions aimed for mechanisms by
which the manufacturer induces the buyer to order the centralized quantity while having
no worse costs than his/her decentralized solution would lead to. As a different and more
environmental solution, the integrated model can be studied under the constraint R ≤ 1 in
search for dispatch quantities that have better (not necessarily best) system costs with lesser
average annual emissions than the decentralized model does. New mechanisms can then be
designed for the retailer to order this environmental quantity.
123
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
For any order quantity Q, the amount of traded carbon credits by the buyer is Xb(Q) =
Cb − fb DQ − gbQ2 − ebD. Observe that Q̂d minimizes fb DQ + gbQ2 with a minimum function
value
√






for all Q ≥ 0. This implies
Xb(Q) ≤ Cb − ebD −
√
2 fbgbD.
Given that (Cb − ebD) ≤ √2gb fbD, it turns out that Xb(Q) ≤ 0 for all Q ≥ 0. That is, the
retailer does not sell carbon credits at any order quantity. In this case, Expression (1) implies
that the retailer’s inventory replenishment problem reduces to minimizing BC1(Q, Xb(Q))
over Q ≥ 0. As given by Expression (15), Q∗d1 is the optimal solution of this problem. 
Development of the other results for the Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 2 The buyer sells carbon credits (i.e., Xb(Q) > 0) only when (Cb − ebD) >√
2gb fbD and Q1 < Q < Q2.
Proof From Lemma 1, we know that if (Cb − ebD) ≤ √2gb fbD, then the buyer does not
sell carbon credits. Therefore, selling carbon credits is possible only when (Cb − ebD) >√
2gb fbD. Furthermore, under this condition, Xb(Q) > 0 should be satisfied. Xb(Q) =
Cb − fb DQ − gbQ2 − ebD > 0 holds for order quantities Q such that Q1 < Q < Q2. Note
that, as (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD, both Q1 and Q2 are defined and Q1 < Q2. 
Lemma 2 implies that in addition to the case of (Cb − ebD) ≤ √2gb fbD suggested by
Lemma1, there are two cases inwhich the retailer does not sell carbon credits: if (Cb−ebD) >√
2gb fbD and Q ≤ Q1, or if (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and Q ≥ Q2.
Lemma 3 Depending on how fbhb compares to Kbgb, the following ordinal relations exist
between Q∗d1 and Q∗d2:
• If fbhb > Kbgb, then Q∗d1 > Q∗d2.• If fbhb = Kbgb, then Q∗d1 = Q∗d2.• If fbhb < Kbgb, then Q∗d1 < Q∗d2.
Proof We will prove the first part of the lemma. The proofs of the remaining two parts are
similar.
Since pbc ≥ psc , fbhb > Kbgb implies that (pbc − psc) fbhb > (pbc − psc)Kbgb. Adding
Kbhb + pbc psc fbgb to both sides of this inequality, and after some rearrangement of terms,
we have
(Kb + pbc fb)(hb + pscgb) > (Kb + psc fb)(hb + pbc gb).
The above expression can be rewritten as
(Kb + pbc fb)
(hb + pbc gb)
>
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which further implies √
2(Kb + pbc fb)D
(hb + pbc gb)
>
√
2(Kb + psc fb)D
(hb + pscgb)
.
Observe that the left-hand side of the above inequality is Q∗d1 and the right-hand side is Q∗d2,
and therefore, Q∗d1 > Q∗d2. 
In the next lemma, we present further properties of the retailer’s problem in the case of
(Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD.
Lemma 4 When (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD, the following cases cannot be observed.
• Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q∗d1.• Q∗d1 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 < Q2.
Proof Let us start with the first part of the lemma. Using Expression (17) and Expression
(19), Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 implies that
Cb − ebD +
√




2(Kb + psc fb)D
hb + pscgb
.
Since (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD, the left-hand side is positive. Therefore, taking the square
of both sides leads to
(Cb − ebD)2 + (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD − gb fbD
gb





Due to Lemma 3, we know that having Q∗d2 ≤ Q∗d1 is possible only when fbhb ≥ Kbgb,
which implies
( fbhb + psc fbgb)D
hb + pscgb





Combining the last two inequalities, we obtain
(Cb − ebD)2 + (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD − gb fbD
gb





Multiplying both sides of the above expression by gb and after some rearrangement of terms,
it follows that
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD ≤ −(Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD.
Recall that,Q1 andQ2 were formedbyconsidering thepositive square root of the discriminant
in Xb(0), and Q2 was defined as the larger root. Since (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD, the above
inequality cannot hold for the positive square root of (Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD. Therefore, we
cannot have Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q∗d1.
Now, let us continue with the second part of the lemma. Using Expression (17) and
Expression (18), Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 implies that√
2(Kb + psc fb)D
hb + pscgb
≤ Cb − ebD −
√
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Taking the square of both sides of this inequality leads to
(Kb + psc fb)D
hb + pscgb
≤ (Cb − ebD)
2 − (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD − gb fbD
(gb)2
,
which is equivalent to
(Kbgb + psc fbgb)D
hb + pscgb
≤ (Cb − ebD)
2 − (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD − gb fbD
gb
.
Based on Lemma 3, having Q∗d2 ≥ Q∗d1 suggests that fbhb ≤ Kbgb, which implies
( fbhb + psc fbgb)D
hb + pscgb
≤ (Cb − ebD)
2 − (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD − gb fbD
gb
.
Observe that the left-hand side of the above inequality reduces to fbD. Therefore, after some
rearrangement of terms, it can be rewritten as
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD ≥ (Cb − ebD)
√
(Cb − ebD)2 − 2gb fbD.
Again, the above inequality cannot hold for the positive square root of (Cb−ebD)2−2gb fbD.
Therefore, we cannot have Q∗d1 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 < Q2. 
The first part of Lemma 4 implies that when (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD, the case of
Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 = Q∗d1 cannot occur. Likewise, the second part implies that when (Cb −
ebD) >
√
2gb fbD, the case of Q∗d1 = Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 < Q2 cannot take place. Combining this
result with Lemma 3 further leads to the following implication: If (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD
and fbhb = Kbgb, the only possible ordering of Q1, Q2, Q∗d1 and Q∗d2 is Q1 < Q∗d1 =
Q∗d2 < Q2, because having (Cb−ebD) >
√
2gb fbD implies Q2 > Q1, and it follows due to
Lemma 3 and the fact that fbhb = Kbgb that Q∗d1 = Q∗d2. Under these conditions, excluding
the cases covered in Lemma 4 from further consideration, the only possible ordering that
remains is Q1 < Q∗d1 = Q∗d2 < Q2.
Lemma 5 If (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb = Kbgb, then Q∗d = Q∗d1 = Q∗d2.
Proof Under the conditions of the lemma, the only possible ordering of Q1, Q2, Q∗d1, and
Q∗d2 is Q1 < Q∗d1 = Q∗d2 < Q2. To prove the lemma, we will consider three regions of Q
separately: Q ≤ Q1, Q1 < Q < Q2, and Q ≥ Q2. Expression (1) and Lemma 2 together
imply that if (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD, for order quantities Q such that Q1 < Q < Q2,
we have BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)); for order quantities Q such that Q ≤ Q1, we
have BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)); for order quantities Q such that Q ≥ Q2, we
have BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)).
Let us start with Q such that Q1 < Q < Q2 and Q 	= Q∗d2. Since Q∗d2 is the unique
minimizer of BC2(Q, Xb(Q)) and BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)), it follows that
BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) > BC2
(
Q∗d2, Xb(Q∗d2)
) = BC (Q∗d2, Xb(Q∗d2)) ,
∀Q s.t. Q1 < Q < Q2 and Q 	= Q∗d2. (33)
Now, let us continue with Q ≤ Q1. Recall that at Q1, we have BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) =
BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)). Since BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function with a unique min-
imizer Q∗d1, and Q ≤ Q1 < Q∗d1, it follows that
BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) ≥ BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) = BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) .
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Using the fact that BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function with a unique minimizer
Q∗d2, and Q1 	= Q∗d2, we further have





Combining the last two inequalities leads to





which is equivalent to




, ∀Q s.t. Q ≤ Q1. (34)
Finally, let us consider order quantities Q such that Q ≥ Q2. Recall that at Q2, we
have BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) = BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)). Since BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex
function with a unique minimizer Q∗d1, and Q∗d1 < Q2 ≤ Q, it follows that
BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) ≥ BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) = BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) .
Using the fact that BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function with a unique minimizer
Q∗d2, and Q2 	= Q∗d2, we further have





Combining the last two inequalities leads to





which, is also equivalent to




, ∀Q s.t. Q ≥ Q2. (35)
Based on Expressions (33), (34), and (35), we conclude that Q∗ = Q∗d2. 
Lemma 1 and Lemma 5 constitute parts of our solution algorithm for the retailer’s decentral-
ized replenishment problem. Lemma 1 suggests the solution in the case of (Cb − ebD) ≤√
2gb fbD, and Lemma 5 provides the solution in the case of (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD
and fbhb = Kbgb. At this point, there is one more case to be considered, that is,
(Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb 	= Kbgb. Before proceeding with a detailed analysis of
this case, let us present another result that applies to the case of (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD in
general.
Lemma 6 When (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD, we have BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) ≤ BC2 (Q, Xb(Q))
for all Q such that Q1 ≤ Q ≤ Q2, and BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) > BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) for all Q such
that Q < Q1 or Q > Q2.
Proof Recall that Xb(Q) = Cb − fb DQ − gbQ2 − ebD, and Xb(Q) = 0 when Q = Q1
and Q = Q2. Furthermore, we have Xb(Q) > 0 for all Q s.t. Q1 < Q < Q2, and we
have Xb(Q) < 0 for all Q s.t. Q < Q1 and for all Q s.t. Q > Q2. We will show that
BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) ≤ BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) if Q ∈ [Q1, Q2]. The proofs of the other parts of the
lemma, which are omitted, follow in a similar fashion.
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which implies BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) ≤ BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)). 
The above lemma will be used in the proofs of the next two results.
Lemma 7 When (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb < Kbgb, the following orderings
among Q1, Q2, Q∗d1, and Q∗d2 cannot take place:
• Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2,• Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q∗d2 < Q2, and• Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 < Q2.
Proof Wewill prove the first two parts of the lemma. Note that the third part is a special case
of Q∗d1 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q1 < Q2 and is covered in Lemma 4.
Due to the strict convexity of BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) and the fact that Q∗d2 is its minimizer,
having Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 implies
BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) > BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) .
At Q = Q1 and Q = Q2, we have BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)). Therefore, the
above inequality is equivalent to the following:
BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) > BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) . (36)
However, due to the strict convexity of BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) and Q∗d1 being its uniqueminimizer,
having Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q2 would imply
BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) < BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) . (37)
Expression (36) and (37) contradict, therefore, it is not possible to have Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q2 ≤
Q∗d2.















BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) due to the strict convexity of BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) and the fact that Q∗d2 is





< BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) .
At Q = Q1, we have BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) = BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)). Therefore, the above





< BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) . (38)
However, due to the strict convexity of BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) and Q∗d1 being its unique mini-





> BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) . (39)
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Table 10 Numerical illustrations of Corollaries 4 and 5 given D = 50, c = 12 and gb = 0.5
Example
index









1 900 1 40 5 7.5 6 300 158.944 168.819 55.279 144.721
2 500 1 90 5 7.5 6 350 157.28 161.245 51.676 348.324
3 900 1 40 5 7.5 6 303 158.944 168.819 49.114 162.886
4 100 1.2 90 5 2.5 2 320 115.175 112.815 100 180
5 40 3.2 90 4.5 2.5 2 304 77.169 72.375 74.549 241.451
6 40 3.2 90 4.5 2.5 2 300 77.169 72.375 82.918 217.082
As Expressions (38) and (39) contradict, it is not possible to have Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q∗d2
< Q2. 
Notice that, since (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb < Kbgb are the two conditions of
Lemma 7, two common properties of the cases considered are Q1 < Q2 and Q∗d1 < Q∗d2.
Lemma 7 further leads to the result in Corollary 4.
Corollary 4 When (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb < Kbgb, the following orderings
are possible:
• Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 < Q∗d2,• Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 ≤ Q2, and• Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2 < Q∗d2.
Numerical instances to illustrate the cases in Corollary 4 (and Corollary 5) are presented
in Table 10. The first three examples of Table 10 correspond to the different cases of the
corollary in the order they are presented.
In the next lemma, we provide a similar result to Lemma 7, now for the case of (Cb −
ebD) >
√
2gb fbD and fbhb > Kbgb.
Lemma 8 When (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb > Kbgb, the following orderings
among Q1, Q2, Q∗d1, and Q∗d2 cannot take place:
• Q∗d2 < Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1,• Q1 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1, and• Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q∗d1.
Proof Similar to the proof of Lemma 7, we will prove the first two parts of the lemma. The
third part is a special case of Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 ≤ Q∗d1 and is covered in Lemma 4.
Let us assume that the ordering in the first part of the lemma takes place. Due to Lemma
6, having Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 implies BC1
(
Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)
) ≥ BC2 (Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)). Furthermore,










> BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)). At Q = Q1, we have BC2 (Q, Xb





> BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)), which contradicts with Q∗d1 being the
minimizer of BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)). Therefore, it is not possible to have Q∗d2 < Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1.
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Let us continue with the proof of the second part by assuming that there exists




) ≥ BC1 (Q∗d2, Xb(Q∗d2)). Furthermore, it follows from the strict con-


















. Using Lemma 6 once again and
the fact that Q∗d1 ≥ Q2, wemust have BC1
(
Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)









. However, this contradicts with
the fact that Q∗d2 is the minimizer of BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)). Therefore, it is not possible to have
Q1 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1. 
Note that under the two conditions of Lemma 8, two common properties of the cases
considered are Q1 < Q2 and Q∗d1 > Q∗d2. Lemma 8 further leads to the result in the next
corollary.
Corollary 5 When (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb > Kbgb, the following orderings
are possible:
• Q1 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q∗d1 < Q2,• Q∗d2 < Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2, and• Q∗d2 < Q∗d1 ≤ Q1 < Q2.
Numerical instances to illustrate the cases in Corollary 5 are also presented in Table 10.
The last three examples of Table 10 correspond to the different cases of the corollary in the
order they are presented.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof will follow based on considering the cases presented in Lemma 1, Lemma 5,
Corollary 4, and Corollary 5.
Case 1: (Cb − ebD) ≤ √2gb fbD
It follows due to Lemma 1 that in this case Q∗d = Q∗d1.
Case 2: (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD
We have the following three subcases ( fbhb = Kbgb, fbhb < Kbgb, and fbhb > Kbgb ):
Case 2.1: (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb = Kbgb
It follows due to Lemma 5 that in this case Q∗d = Q∗d2.
Case 2.2: (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb < Kbgb
Corollary 4 implies the following three subcases: Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 < Q∗d2, Q1 < Q∗d1 <
Q∗d2 ≤ Q2, and Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2 < Q∗d2. We present a detailed proof for the first subcase.
Since the proofs of the other subcases are similar, we present sketches of the proofs for those.
• Case 2.2.1: Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 < Q∗d2
Note that the subcase of Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 is distinguished from the other
two by the fact that Q2 ≤ Q∗d1. The proof will follow by considering three dif-
ferent regions of Q (Q > Q2, Q1 ≤ Q ≤ Q2, Q < Q1), and in each case
by showing that BC
(
Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)
) ≤ BC (Q, Xb(Q)). Let us start with Q val-
ues such that Q > Q2. Expression (1) and Lemma 2 imply that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) =
BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)). By definition, Q∗d1 is the minimizer of BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)), therefore,




. Since Q∗d1 is also in the region of Q val-
ues considered (i.e., Q∗d1 ≥ Q2), this, in turn, is equivalent to BC (Q, Xb(Q)) ≥
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. Now, let us consider Q values such that Q1 ≤ Q ≤ Q2.
Expression (1) and Lemma 2 imply that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)). Since
BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function with a unique minimizer Q∗d2 and
Q < Q∗d2, BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)), and hence BC (Q, Xb(Q)), is decreasing in this region.
Therefore, BC (Q, Xb(Q)) ≥ BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) for all Q such that Q1 ≤ Q ≤ Q2.
Furthermore, we have BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) = BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) = BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2))
and BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) ≥ BC1
(
Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)
) = BC (Q∗d1, Xb(Q∗d1)). Hence,




. Finally, let us consider Q values such that
Q < Q1. Again, due to Expression (1) and Lemma 2, we know that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) =
BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)). Since BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function with a unique
minimizer Q∗d1 and Q < Q∗d1, BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)), and hence BC (Q, Xb(Q)), is decreas-
ing in this region. Therefore, BC (Q, Xb(Q)) > BC (Q1, Xb(Q1)) for all Q such
that Q < Q1. We have discussed above that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) is decreasing over
Q1 ≤ Q ≤ Q2, hence BC (Q1, Xb(Q1)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)). Combining the last two
results implies BC (Q, Xb(Q)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)). We have also argued above that










• Case 2.2.2: Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q∗d2 ≤ Q2




for all Q ∈ [Q1, Q2], because,
Q1 < Q∗d2 ≤ Q2 and BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) in this region of Q val-
ues. Next, we use the facts that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) for all Q ∈
(Q2,∞), BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) is increasing in this region, and BC1 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) =
BC2 (Q2, Xb(Q2)) to conclude that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)). This




for all Q ∈ (Q2,∞).
Finally, using the facts that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) for all Q such that
Q < Q1, BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) is decreasing in this region, and BC1 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) =
BC2 (Q1, Xb(Q1)) to conclude that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) > BC (Q1, Xb(Q1)). This further




for all Q such that Q < Q1.
• Case 2.2.3: Q1 < Q∗d1 < Q2 < Q∗d2
We have BC (Q, Xb(Q)) ≥ BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) for all Q ∈ [Q1, Q2], because,
BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) and Q1 < Q2 < Q∗d2 (implying that
BC2 (Q, Xb(Q)) is decreasing in this region of Q values). Next, we use the facts that
BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) for all Q ∈ (Q2,∞) and Q∗d1 < Q2 (implying
that BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) is increasing in this region) to conclude that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) >
BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)). Finally, using the facts that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) = BC1 (Q, Xb(Q))
for all Q such that Q < Q1, and Q1 < Q∗d1 (implying that BC1 (Q, Xb(Q)) is
decreasing in this region),we conclude that BC (Q, Xb(Q)) > BC (Q1, Xb(Q1)). Com-
bining this with the fact that BC (Q1, Xb(Q1)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) further leads to
BC (Q, Xb(Q)) > BC (Q2, Xb(Q2)) for all Q such that Q < Q1.
Case 2.2: (Cb − ebD) > √2gb fbD and fbhb > Kbgb
Corollary 5 implies the following three subcases: Q∗d2 < Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d1, Q1 ≤ Q∗d2 <
Q2 ≤ Q∗d1, Q1 < Q2 ≤ Q∗d2 < Q∗d1. A detailed proof will be omitted for this case as it
follows by analyzing the different subcases, as in the proof of Case 2.1. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose Cb − ebD ≤ √2gb fbD. Using Expression (1) and Lemma 1, BC(Q, Xb(Q)) =
BC1(Q, Xb(Q)) for all Q. Since BC1(Q, Xb(Q)) is a strictly convex function of Q,
BC(Q, Xb(Q)) is also a strictly convex function of Q.
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Now, suppose that Cb − ebD > √2gb fbD. The proof will follow by showing that
BC(αQa+(1−α)Qb, Xb(αQa+(1−α)Qb)) < αBC(Qa, Xb(Qa))+(1−α)BC(Qb, Xb
(Qb)) for all Qa  0, Qb  0 (Qa 	= Qb), and αε(0, 1). First, observe from Expression (1),
Lemma 2, and Lemma 6 that BC(Q, Xb(Q)) = max{BC1(Q, Xb(Q)), BC2(Q, Xb(Q))}
when Cb − ebD > √2gb fbD. Since BC1(Q, Xb(Q)) and BC2(Q, Xb(Q)) are strictly
convex functions of Q, it follows that BC1(αQa + (1 − α)Qb, Xb(αQa + (1 −
α)Qb)) < αBC1(Qa, Xb(Qa)) + (1 − α)BC1(Qb, Xb(Qb)) and BC2(αQa + (1 −
α)Qb, Xb(αQa + (1 − α)Qb)) < αBC2(Qa, Xb(Qa)) + (1 − α)BC2(Qb, Xb(Qb)) for
all Qa  0, Qb  0 (Qa 	= Qb) and αε(0, 1). Combining this with BC(Q, Xb(Q)) =
max{BC1(Q, Xb(Q)), BC2(Q, Xb(Q))} leads to BC1(αQa + (1 − α)Qb, Xb(αQa +
(1 − α)Qb)) < αBC(Qa, Xb(Qa)) + (1 − α)BC(Qb, Xb(Qb)) and BC2(αQa + (1 −
α)Qb, Xb(αQa + (1−α)Qb)) < αBC(Qa, Xb(Qa)) + (1 − α)BC(Qb, Xb(Qb)). Hence,
max{BC1(αQa + (1−α)Qb, Xb(αQa + (1−α)Qb)), BC2(αQa + (1−α)Qb, Xb(αQa +
(1−α)Qb))} < αBC(Qa, Xb(Qa))+(1−α)BC(Qb, Xb(Qb)). Note that the left-hand side
of this inequality is BC(Q, Xb(Q)). Thus, BC(Q, Xb(Q)) is also a strictly convex function
of Q if Cb − ebD > √2gb fbD. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Using Equations (28) and (31), we have Q∗d  Q∗c if and only if√
2(Kb + tb fb)D
hb + tbgb 
√
2(Kb + Kv + tb fb + tv fv)D
hb + tbgb + (hv + tvgv) DP
.
Taking the square of both sides leads to
2(Kb + tb fb)D
hb + tbgb 
2(Kb + Kv + tb fb + tv fv)D
hb + tbgb + (hv + tvgv) DP
.
This, in turn, implies
Kbhb + Kbtbgb + Kbhv DP + Kbtvgv DP + tb fbhb + t2b fbgb + hvtb fb DP + tb fbtvgv DP
 Kbhb + Kvhb + hbtb fb + hbtv fv + Kbtbgb + Kvtbgb + t2b fbgb + tbgbtvgv.
After some cancellations and rearrangement of terms, we get
(Kb + tb fb)(hv + tvgv)D
P
 (Kv + tv fv)(hb + tbgb).
This results in
Kb + tb fb
hb + tbgb 






Proof of Proposition 4




D is equivalent to Q
∗
d ≤ Q∗c .
Multiplying both sides of the inequality tb fb+tv fv
tbgb+ tv gvDP
 Kb+tb fbhb+tbgb with 2D and taking the
square root of both sides, we obtain
√




2(Kb + tb fb)D
hb + tbgb ,
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which implies Qtc ≤ Q∗d . Combining this result with the fact that Q∗d ≤ Q∗c implies
that Qtc ≤ Q∗d ≤ Q∗c . Since T T (Q) is a strictly convex function, this implies that
T T (Q∗c) ≥ T T (Q∗d). That is, in the centralized solution, the government collects at least
the same amount of taxes as it collects in the decentralized solution.






d ≤ Q∗c .
Multiplying both sides of the inequality tb fb+tv fv
tbgb+ tv gvDP
 Kb+Kv+tb fb+tv fv
hb+tbgb+(hv+tvgv) DP
with 2D and
taking the square root of both sides, we obtain
√




2(Kb + Kv + tb fb + tv fv)D
hb + tbgb + (hv + tvgv) DP
,
which is equivalent to Qtc ≥ Q∗c . Combining this result with the fact that Q∗d ≤ Q∗c
implies Qtc ≥ Q∗c ≥ Q∗d . Since T T (Q) is a strictly convex function, this implies
T T (Q∗d) ≥ T T (Q∗c). That is, in the decentralized solution, the government collects
at least the same amount of taxes as it collects in the centralized solution. 
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